Übersetzung für "Säkulare stagnation" in Englisch

Secular stagnation threatens the West, accompanied by rising protectionism sentiment.

Secular stagnation was just an excuse for flawed economic policies.

But it is not enough to assert that secular stagnation is possible.

On the contrary, it promises more asset bubbles, financial crises, and Japanese-style secular stagnation.

But beyond this, one should view secular stagnation as an opportunity rather than a threat.

For the many, by contrast, there has been only secular stagnation, with depressed employment and stagnating wages.

The result of these persistent conditions can be called “secular stagnation one” (SS1).

Secular stagnation refers to a situation of chronic underselling of a country’s goods and services.

With 18 million people unemployed in the EU, we must prevent such a secular stagnation.

In today’s crisis, muddling through would be a recipe for a continuation of the crisis and secular stagnation of the type once described by Alvin Hansen, a contemporary of Keynes.

The economist Larry Summers has reintroduced the term “secular stagnation” to describe what awaits us.

The novelty of Summers’s argument is the claim that “secular stagnation” began 15-20 years before the crash.

The generalized version of this proposition is that secular stagnation – the persistent underuse of potential resources – is the fate of all economies that rely on private investment to fill the gap between income and consumption.

Harvard University economist Lawrence Summers points to “secular stagnation,” a term coined by the economist Alvin Hansen in the 1930s to describe long-term tepid demand and insufficient opportunity for profitable investment.

Only bold policies can halt Europe’s slide toward secular stagnation and nationalist populism.

If secular stagnation persists, these countries will have to undertake painful structural reforms, figure out how to restructure their promises (debts, social-security commitments, and pledges to keep taxes low), and distribute the resulting burden.

Indeed, if the advanced economies were to suffer from secular stagnation, a world with negative interest rates on both short- and long-term bonds could become the new normal.

Today, by contrast, widespread malaise and forecasts of secular stagnation make promises about a better future appear fraudulent.

Although secular stagnation became a meme five years after the 2008 financial crisis, the term itself is much older.

And I have provided an internally coherent theory whereby secular stagnation arises naturally as a consequence of low expectations on the part of households and firms about the future value of their assets.

Since then, they have fallen back on a discredited theory of “secular stagnation” to explain the tepid recovery.

Our politicians shun it in favor of “challenges,” while our economists talk of “secular stagnation.”

Thus, for the time being, we are likely to remain in what the IMF calls the “new mediocre,” Larry Summers calls “secular stagnation,” and the Chinese call the “new normal.”

Some economists call this “secular stagnation” – a fancy way of saying that the good times are gone for good.

I continue to have disagreements with Stiglitz on the record of policy advice, and with both Stiglitz and Farmer on some points of theory regarding secular stagnation.

Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, these developments have even become more pronounced and are interpreted as the beginning of a period of secular stagnation.

Discussion of secular stagnation, the limits to the effectiveness of monetary policy and the burden of debt at the global level are a reflection of a gradual, or occasionally marked erosion in confidence about a return to higher levels of economic growth.

For example, given the debate on a supposed ‘secular stagnation’, a phase of a low economic growth, low interest rates and low inflation, we need to examine the prospects for growth and investment in Germany, Europe and the world.

They argue that "secular stagnation" and a negative rate of interest could only arise if prices and wages cannot adjust downwards and that such a situation is very unlikely at least in the medium and long run.